The budgets announced by Ligue 1 clubs for the 2026-2027 season outline a financial hierarchy where PSG dominates the competition with an amount several dozens of times greater than that of Le Havre. Measuring these gross disparities is no longer sufficient: the drop in domestic TV rights, which fell from around €467 million in 2021-2022 to €226 million in 2024-2025 according to the accounts published by the DNCG, redefines what it means to “manage well” a French club.
TV Rights in Ligue 1: the resource that is collapsing and redistributing power dynamics
The notable fact of recent seasons is not the ranking of budgets, but the foundation on which they rest. Audiovisual revenues from Ligue 1 have dropped by more than 50% over three seasons. For 2025-2026, the transition to Ligue 1+ (the league becoming its own broadcaster) no longer guarantees a fixed amount to clubs.
The domestic rights actually paid hover around €180 million for all clubs. The situation worsens further in 2026-2027 with the disappearance of the €78.5 million that beIN paid for one match per matchday. This withdrawal deprives the championship of a recurring source of revenue that media clubs had integrated into their forecasts.
To understand in detail the budget of Ligue 1 clubs and the mechanisms that structure them, one must start from this reality: the television windfall that financed French football has dried up, and no upcoming contract promises a return to previous levels.
3:1 Ratio on TV Rights: the legal cap that changes the interpretation of budgets
The law regarding the organization, management, and financing of professional sports, adopted on July 21, 2026, introduces a structuring rule. A maximum ratio of 3:1 now frames the gap between the highest-paid club and the lowest-paid club based solely on domestic rights.
This cap does not reduce the overall budget of PSG or OM, which are fueled by commercial revenues and European competition income. However, it compresses the advantage that top-table clubs derived from TV redistribution compared to promoted teams or those at the bottom of the table.
| Mechanism | Before the law | After the law (2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Gap in domestic TV rights (1st / last) | No legal cap | Maximum ratio of 3:1 |
| Financial control | DNCG only | DNCG + Court of Auditors |
| Total audiovisual revenues | ~€467 million (2021-2022) | ~€180 million (2025-2026) |
The other novelty of this law is the double financial control. The Court of Auditors can now audit professional leagues and their commercial subsidiaries. A club can pass the DNCG without difficulty while exposing itself to a Court audit if its economic model relies on revenue assumptions deemed fragile.
Player Sales in Ligue 1: the structural adjustment variable
The direct consequence of the collapse of TV rights, documented by Le Figaro and the DNCG, is clear: Ligue 1 is condemned to sell more and more to balance its accounts. This is no longer a development strategy; it is a mechanism for budgetary survival.
Training clubs (Rennes, Nice, Lyon, Lille) are managing to navigate this context. Their ability to generate capital gains from transfers partially offsets the drop in TV revenues. Conversely, clubs that buy established players without massive commercial revenues take on disproportionate risks.
- Training clubs offset the drop in TV revenues with regular capital gains from transfers, stabilizing their budget despite audiovisual revenues halved.
- Clubs dependent on TV rights without a training pool (recently promoted teams, teams without a strong academy) see their room for maneuver shrink each season.
- PSG, with its commercial and European revenues, escapes this logic, but its budget does not reflect the economic reality of the league in which it competes.
The trap of ambitious transfer windows without financial backing
Several media clubs maintained high transfer spending in 2026-2027 despite downward revenue forecasts. The gap between the sporting ambition displayed during the transfer window and the budgetary reality creates a risk that the DNCG is closely monitoring.
A club that allocates a disproportionate share of its budget to payroll, without certainty about its future audiovisual revenues, exposes itself to sanctions during the season. The disappearance of the beIN contract makes these forecasts even more uncertain than before.
Well-managed Ligue 1 clubs in 2026: what concrete indicators
The raw ranking of budgets masks management disparities. A club with a €40 million budget that self-finances its transfers and keeps its payroll under 60% of its revenues is better managed than a structurally deficit club with a €120 million budget.
Three criteria allow for distinguishing virtuous clubs:
- The payroll/revenue ratio: above 70%, the DNCG considers the club to be in a risk zone, regardless of the gross budget amount.
- Diversification of revenues: ticketing, sponsorship, merchandising, European revenues. Clubs that depend on domestic TV rights for more than 40% are the most exposed to the current situation.
- Net transfer capacity: a regular positive balance in the transfer market indicates a sustainable model, whereas a recurring negative balance signals a forward flight.
The double control established by the July 2026 law should make these indicators more visible. The Court of Auditors, unlike the DNCG, does not only assess a club’s ability to complete a season but the viability of its model over multiple seasons.
The 2026-2027 season will serve as a real-world test. With TV rights at their lowest, a legal redistribution ratio, and an additional control body, clubs that spend beyond their real means will no longer have the option to delay adjustment.
